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Towards Convergence?
New Labour’s Third Way and the
SPD’s Agenda 2010 in Comparative Perspective
Christian Schweiger1
Abstract
This article provides a comparative analysis of the ‘third way’
economic and social policy approach of New Labour in the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the Agenda 2010 reform programme imple-
mented by the SPD under Gerhard Schröder in Germany. The
study tries to show that a substantial degree of policy-learning
can occur between countries if national policy-makers share the
same programmatic positions in a policy area and domestic in-
stitutions at the same time fail to produce efficient outcomes.
The post-2005 renewed divergence between New Labour’s focus
on further welfare reforms and the SPD’s role as the guardian of
the domestic welfare status quo however reinforces the impor-
tance of domestic path-dependent institutional constraints for
policy outcomes.
Zusammenfassung: Auf dem Weg zum Konsensmodell?
New Labour’s „dritter Weg“ und die „Agenda 2010“ der
SPD in vergleichender Perspektive
Der vorliegenden Artikel enthält eine vergleichende Studie
zwischen dem wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Ansatz des
„dritten Weges“ unter New Labour in Großbritannien und der
von der SPD unter Bundeskanzler Schröder entwickelten Agen-
da 2010. Die Studie versucht zu zeigen, dass signifikante Lern-
prozesse zwischen den politisch Verantwortlichen über Länder-
grenzen hinweg möglich sind, falls übereinstimmende program-
matische Ansätze vorliegen und bestehende nationale Institutio-
nen sich als nicht effektiv zur Lösung anstehender Probleme
erweisen. Die sich seit 2005 erneut abzeichnende Divergenz
zwischen der Fortentwicklung arbeits- und sozialpolitischer Re-
formen unter New Labour und der Rückbesinnung der SPD auf
ihre Rolle als Partei des sozialstaatlichen Status Quo macht je-
doch deutlich, dass etablierte institutionelle Hindernisse im na-
tionalen Kontext weiterhin von zentraler Bedeutung für die kon-
krete Ausgestaltung von Politikwandel sind.
The British and German economic models have been at the
core of the Varieties of Capitalism distinction between liberal
and coordinated economies with each possessing its own speci-
fic comparative advantages. In the case of the former this mani-
fests itself in a culture of free market competition while the lat-
ter has developed a distinctive set of institutions, which allow
cooperation between actors outside the realm of the market
(Hall / Soskice 2001: 19). Using Esping-Andersen’s welfare state
typologies, liberal economies tend to be associated with welfare
states that provide a rather modest and short-term level of basis
assistance for the unemployed which is strictly means-tested,
while the corporatist welfare states of coordinated economies
like Germany tend to be orientated towards high levels of in-
come replacement during unemployment. Incentives for the un-
employed to return to work in the liberal economy are therefore
high, while they remain low in the corporatist welfare states
(Esping-Andersen 1993: 26 – 27 and 224).
This article provides a comparative empirical analysis of the
economic and social policies of New Labour in the UK and the
SPD in Germany which aims to show that, in spite of a number
of substantial reforms which both parties introduced in recent
years, the intrinsic institutional path-dependency of the British
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1 Ich danke den Gutachtern des Sozialen Fortschritts für die wert-
volle Kommentare.
and the German economy has in both cases survived the intro-
duction of a set of substantial policy reforms. In the German
case the welfare reforms implemented under the Agenda 2010
showed substantial elements of policy learning from New La-
bour’s ‘third way’ welfare-to-work approach. This was supported
by the combination of the political correspondence between
New Labour under Blair and the SPD under Schröder and the
general encouragement to adopt best practice from other mem-
ber states under the EU open method of coordination. In this
respect New Labour managed to successfully upload its ‘third
way’ welfare-to-work political approach, which it had pre-
viously adopted from the New Democrats under president Bill
Clinton in the US (Gould 1998: 235 – 236), to the EU policy
framework level. The priority for welfare targeted at bringing
people back into work consequently became the heart of the
EU’s Lisbon Strategy and the attached mechanism of best-prac-
tice benchmarking of national employment figures under the
open method of coordination. Based on its remarkably good
record of job creation since 1997, the New Labour government
was self-confident in promoting its welfare strategy as a role
model for the rest of the EU. Peter Mandelson even claimed in
2005 that ‘New Labour is inspiring Europe’2.
New Labour’s ideological influence became apparent in the
2005 revision of the Lisbon targets, which now prioritise ‘jobs
and growth’ (European Commission 2005). The ‘third way’
priorities of targeted activation of the unemployed through a
mixture of compulsory active labour market policies based on
investment in education, training and work-orientated tax credits
subsequently became the core of the European Employment
Strategy. The EES monitors national labour market performance
on the basis of overall targets and country-specific policy re-
commendations (Büchs 2007: 48).
The path-dependent approach developed by historical institu-
tionalists such as Pierson assumes that national actors are reluc-
tant to change the domestic institutional setting in which they
have been socialised due to expectation that these will continue
to produce ‘increasing returns’ in terms of policy outcomes.
Pierson emphasises that these ‘increasing returns’ occur in the
form of ‘self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes’ result-
ing from existing institutions and policies, which makes it less
likely that policy-makers consider alternatives (Pierson 2000:
252). Following this approach it is obvious that processes of pol-
icy learning usually only occur when these returns are no longer
deemed to be sufficient or at least when it is assumed that the
cost of change may be smaller than the cost of continuing to stay
on the same path. Substantial change to public policies and in
some cases even institutions are therefore most likely if substan-
tial crises, which Pierson describes as fundamental junctures or
‘exogenous shocks’ (Pierson 2000: 266) emerge. These shocks
reveal shortcomings of established policies or institutional prac-
tices which in turn leads domestic actors, albeit often reluctantly,
to prioritise change over the continuation on the established
path-dependent course.
The expectation amongst political decision-makers that
changes to either the established set of policies, or more funda-
mentally, the underlying established institutional framework
may produce short-term results in terms of producing a political
advantage for themselves make it more likely that they will de-
cide to steer away from the previous pathway (Pierson, 2000:
261). Yet policy change tends to be easier to achieve than at-
tempts to alter the established institutional setting in which these
policies are implemented (Pierson, 2000: 259). The historical
institutionalist approach is crucial in highlighting the impor-
tance of intrinsic national economic and welfare state traditions
when determining the preferences of domestic actors. The weak-
ness of the path dependency concept lies in its assumption that,
other than in the economic sphere, in politics the review of poli-
cies and institutions does not occur on the basis of more sophis-
ticated learning processes which go beyond a simply domestic
‘trial and error fashion’ (Pierson 2000: 261). This ignores the
increasing importance of new transnational mechanisms of pol-
icy-learning like the EU open method coordination, which en-
courage the horizontal dimension of policy-learning between
countries on the basis of a comparative rational choice analysis
(‘benchmarking’) of existing domestic path-dependent policies
(Borrás / Jacobsson 2004: 195). As a number of studies have
shown, mechanisms like the open method of coordination, are
effective in encouraging the shift from the established status
quo, even if they are hardly the only causal factor for these
changes and usually only act as a catalyst for existing domestic
reform pressures on the basis of crisis ‘tipping points’ (Dyson /
Padgett 2005: 116), which usually stem from economic pres-
sures (Hough / Sloam 2007: 31).
The comparative case study in this article attempts to show
that the processes of policy learning which lead national actors
to consider policy choices in other countries continue to take
place in a predominantly path-dependent domestic context.
Even after the decision to change policies or individual institu-
tions has been made, these changes are frequently confronted
with fundamental obstacles. The latter manifest themselves as
opposition from domestic vested interests who try to defend the
previous status quo and also existing institutional veto players.
This is most prominent in the ‘semisovereign’ German political
system, where the federal government needs to seek consensus
with regional governments in the Federal Council in a wide
range of policy areas and the Federal Constitutional Court acts
as the final referee in case of disputes about substantial policy
changes (Green / Paterson 2008: 184).
The nature and the pace of the change that occurs is strongly
determined by the domestic institutional setting of the country
involved and is most likely to take considerable time to take ef-
fect (Pierson 2000: 261). Even if a country faces significant re-
form pressures and a rational analysis of the circumstances
would indicate that this should almost inevitably result in pro-
found reforms of the status quo, the perspective for change ulti-
mately depends on the willingness of national actors and institu-
tions to abandon the path-dependent route (Turner / Green 2007:
16). The institutionalist acknowledgement of the effects of na-
tional path-dependent institutional particularities on policy out-
comes makes it very distinctive from the perspective of the con-
vergence thesis put forward by some economists (Barro / Sala-i-
Martin 1991; Parker 1998; Sinn 2004). While the latter assume
that external economic pressures inevitably push national econo-
mies towards the adoption of a deregulated liberal convergence
model, the historical institutionalist perspective emphasises that
even if countries apply similar policies to solve common pres-
sures (such as unemployment), the outcome of these policies are
likely to be distinctively different in each national context. Hay
has developed this perspective even further by emphasising that
one cannot assume that the convergence of policies between
countries will automatically result in a convergence of out-
comes. He points out that ‘if we assume the path dependence of
institutional and cultural dynamics, then the same policy is
likely to have different institutional and cultural consequences
(over whatever time-horizon) in different institutional and cul-
tural environments’ (Hay 2000: 514).
In this context national governments tend to influence and
subsequently use the OMC as a means to strengthen the case for
reform against opposition at home on the basis of ‘invited duti-
fulness’ (Büchs 2008: 27). In the case of the German Hartz
labour market reforms outlined in this article, which mainly
emerged on the basis of expert advice from a Commission led
by the former Volkswagen executive Peter Hartz, the influence
of the OMC on the domestic level of policy-making can clearly
be detected. The Hartz Commission was installed by Chancellor
Schröder to overcome opposition within his own political ranks
and amongst the opposition parties used the OMC to embed
their reform proposal into the wider European employment
policy context (Büchs 2007: 75 and 2008: 29). The OMC and
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Mandelson’, 3 February.
European employment targets did however hardly feature in the
public discourse on the Hartz reforms in Germany (de la Porte /
Nanz 2004: 277). This shows that while OMC encourages new
forms of national decision-making in the area of social policy
which broadens the participative discourse, it tends to do so
at the expense of the traditional parliamentary route (Borrás /
Jacobsson 2004: 200). This usually occurs by enhancing the in-
fluence of non-governmental networks of policy experts rather
than the general public.
The problematic aspect of this is that these experts are not
directly accountable to the national parliament and the electo-
rate, which opens the OMC to the accusation that it is encoura-
ging the establishment of a new sphere of elite-driven policy-
making based on ‘expert deliberation’ beyond the public realm
(de la Porte / Nanz 2004: 283; Benz 2007: 515). The process of
policy learning in the case of New Labour and the SPD was fa-
cilitated by the existence of a wider policy network between
centre-left governments in Europe and also the US, which had
initiated a debate on policy options for a reformed European
Social Democracy in the late 1990s. Substantially influenced by
New Labour’s ‘third way’ approach, European centre-left gov-
ernments held a number of progressive governance network con-
ferences in 1999, which included Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder,
US president Bill Clinton and the Dutch prime minister Wim
Kok, who later became the head of the expert commission on
the revision of the Lisbon Strategy. The first communiqué issued
by the network in Berlin on June 3rd 2000 reflected the emerging
consensus on New Labour’s ‘welfare to work’ employment strat-
egy and set the direction for the OMC as a method of ‘best prac-
tice’ learning that would be applied in the EU Lisbon Strategy
(Policy Network 2000).
Parallel to this a joint paper on the future of Social Demo-
cratic governance in Europe (Blair-Schröder paper) had emerged
in 1999. It resulted from intense discussions between the close
confidants of both leaders, Blair’s special advisor Peter Mandel-
son and Bodo Hombach, Schröder’s chief of staff in the German
Chancellory. As will be outlined in this article, this now largely
forgotten paper has to still be regarded as the reflection of a
political consensus on economic and social policy priorities
between the top leadership of New Labour and the SPD at the
time, even if it had initially seemed as if Schröder was not fully
supportive of the substance of the paper. This was due to his
cautiousness with regard to the implementation of the ‘welfare
to work’strategy into concrete policy reform.
The incremental bias against radical reform which is at the
heart of the German polity explains why the Hartz labour market
and welfare state reforms introduced by the Schröder govern-
ment were mainly targeted towards policy reform rather than
trying to achieve a substantial overhaul of the core institutional
foundations of the German model, such as the system of collec-
tive bargaining, the right against unfair dismissal, works coun-
cils and the industry-wide general wage agreements. In spite of
these rather modest changes, the Hartz reforms continue to be
fundamentally unpopular amongst the German public and sub-
stantially contributed to the failure of Schröder to be re-elected
in 2005.
The EU’s open method of coordination approach in the area
of economic and social policy has promoted increasing levels of
policy-learning between member states in the European Union,
particularly in the development of active labour market policies
(de la Porte 2007: 31). National policy-makers adopt these pro-
cesses with the aim of preserving the comparative advantage of
their respective national political economy by trying to achieve
more efficient ways of interaction between its central economic
actors (Hall / Soskice 2001: 45). In the case of New Labour and
the SPD the political consensus and the process of policy-learn-
ing occurred during a limited period, at a time when New La-
bour’s Third Way approach was able to successfully promote it-
self as the best practice model for economic growth and job
creation in the EU on the basis of the stable post-1997 boom.
This allowed Schröder to use the 2002 unemployment crisis to
push through his own preference for the Third Way’s ‘welfare to
work’ approach by using expert advice which promoted the in-
troduction of the principle into the German employment system
as a way to stabilise rather than to undermine the core institu-
tional setting of the German social market economy.
1. The Blair-Schröder Paper: A Basis for Policy Learning
The joint Blair-Schröder paper on The Way Forward for Euro-
pe’s Social Democrats, published in June 1999, remains a cru-
cial but rather surprisingly a widely neglected source for the
analysis of socio-economic policy correspondences between the
SPD and New Labour. Due to the internal divisions in the SPD
over the party’s economic policy in the aftermath of the 1998
election victory, these however only became apparent later on
and for a limited period, from around 2002 until the run-up to
the early 2005 general election in Germany.
Schröder quickly moved away from the common reform agen-
da with Blair due to strong opposition within the SPD against
the proposals made in the joint paper. His critics, particularly his
main inner party rival, party leader and finance minister Oskar
Lafontaine, had dismissed the ideas set out in the paper as sub-
stantially neo-liberal and therefore contradictory to traditional
Social Democratic values (Lafontaine 1999:185). The paper
subsequently almost completely disappeared from public aware-
ness, especially in the United Kingdom. Schröder only returned
to the core ideas of the paper in 2002, when Germany’s worsen-
ing employment figures forced him to consider labour market
reforms which were seen as relatively radical in the German do-
mestic context.
The resulting Agenda 2010 reform programme, in particular
the substantial reduction of financial support for the unem-
ployed under the Hartz IV labour market reforms reflected the
principles which the Blair-Schröder paper had originally set out
(Funk 2007: 129). Schröder himself explicitly conceded this in
his political memoirs in 2006 (Schröder 2006: 276). The incor-
poration of core principles of the Blair-Schröder paper into the
red-green coalition’s 2002 Agenda 2010 was a manifestation of
Schröder’s deep-seated sympathies for New Labour’s ‘Third
Way’ economic approach, especially the essential welfare-to-
work principle.
This had already become obvious during the run-up to the
1998 general election campaign when Schröder tried to present
himself as a reformed Social Democrat, who would represent
‘Die neue Mitte’ (the new middle ground). He concentrated on
the concept of an ‘activating state’ and categorically rejected
calls for large-scale Keynesian public spending programmes
(Schröder 1998a: 39). Once elected as Chancellor, he clarified
that his policy of the ‘new middle ground’ would be aimed at
activating the individual responsibility of each citizen in his first
official declaration to the German parliament (Schröder 1998b).
The concept of the ‘Neue Mitte’ with its emphasis on self-re-
sponsibility and the notion of an activating state had clearly
been inspired by New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ philosophy. Tony
Blair called it a new pragmatic left-of-centre approach which
would go beyond the dogmas of the traditional left and right and
create a new relationship between government and business
(Blair 1995a). At the heart of the ‘Third Way’ is the redefinition
of the notion of modern, active citizenship and individual re-
sponsibility, where the role of the state is transformed from a
provider of all-encompassing care for its citizens to that of a fa-
cilitator of individual potential (Blair 1995b). State supervision
of individual need in the form of rigid means testing hence be-
comes the norm and benefit recipients are expected to accept
state assistance to get back into work. Anthony Giddens, who
provided New Labour with the conceptual framework for this
new middle-of-the-way policy concept, described his ‘third way’
approach as a new Social Democratic agenda which would break
down the traditional boundaries of left and right. He called on
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the new left to create a “society of ‘responsible risk takers’”
(Giddens 1998: 100).
Tony Blair’s and Gerhard Schröder’s shared admiration for
this approach was expressed in their joint position paper. The
paper was mainly the result of intense consultations between
their two senior advisors, Peter Mandelson and Bodo Hombach.
The Blair-Schröder paper emphasised the need to adopt a prag-
matic and facilitating role for government, based on the en-
couragement of ‘individual achievement and success, business
spirit, personal responsibility and a sense of community’ (Blair /
Schröder 1999: 2). Schröder was hampered in his efforts to put
these principles into concrete policies by his finance minister
Oskar Lafontaine, who dismissed the paper as a modern form of
Thatcherism, which in his opinion belonged in the ‘waste bas-
ket’ (Lafontaine 1999: 190). Lafontaine blocked any attempts by
Schröder to introduce structural reforms of the labour market
and the welfare system and unexpectedly resigned as finance
minister and SPD leader in March 1999, following a row with
Schröder over his Keynesian spending plans.
Schröder reform aspirations nevertheless faced the biggest
hurdle in the structural constraints of the German polity, which
is characterised by a weak executive and the existence of a mul-
tiplicity of veto points and players on the federal, regional and
local level. In an institutional setting which Katzenstein distinc-
tively characterised as semi-sovereign (Katzenstein 1987), swift
and radical policy change is very difficult to achieve. The Ger-
man system forces the federal government into a constant pro-
cess of consensual bargaining with a variety of veto players
(coalition partners, the Bundesrat, the Federal Constitutional
Court). The two major parties are consequently forced to enter a
constant informal grand coalition if they want to avoid political
stalemate (Saalfeld 2006: 250; Strohmeier 2006: 234). The
scope for either the SPD or the CDU /CSU to implement the
core agenda of their individual election manifestos with one of
the smaller parties therefore remains substantially limited. This
has become even more noticeable in the domestic political set-
ting of the unified Germany, which is characterised by a greater
diversity of interests and a decline in electoral support for the
larger parties (Sieberer 2006, 67). Schröder attempted to over-
come the domestic German institutional constraints by using ex-
pert advice in the form of commissions as a means to weaken
the authority of the political opposition against his government’s
agenda. The first phase of this ‘government by commission’ ap-
proach (Dyson 2005: 288) was the consensus-orientated Bündnis
für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs), established in the aftermath of the
1998 election victory. It assembled employers, trade unions and
the government at a round table. The Alliance for Jobs forum
was an attempt on the Chancellor’s part to weaken the influence
of the traditionalists within his own party and to manage oppo-
sition from vested interests effectively (Streeck / Hassel, 2004:
114). The failure of the Alliance to produce concrete consensual
proposals for structural reforms confirmed the public perception
of Schröder as a rather weak reformer, which was strengthened
when he characterised his style of governing as ‘the steady hand’.
The situation for Blair’s New Labour government was funda-
mentally different. The decisive executive powers granted to the
government in the British polity, combined with the small num-
ber of veto players, who have only a limited influence on the
government’s legislative agenda allows swift and profound pol-
icy changes, provided the government has a sufficient majority
in parliament. Blair’s two landslide victories in 1997 and 2001
provided him with a clear mandate to introduce radical reform
in Britain. New Labour consequently swiftly pushed through
changes to the tax and benefits system, which were aimed at the
concrete implementation of the ‘welfare to work’ principle.
Straight after its 1997 general election victory the government
introduced a welfare-to-work budget, which was mainly fi-
nanced by a windfall tax on excess profits made from privatised
utilities. As set out in its election manifesto, New Labour as-
pired to eradicate poverty and exclusion in Britain on the basis
of the notion of a ‘stakeholder economy’. It was aimed at
achieving full employment by making it an obligatory choice for
the unemployed to either take up work or to opt for further train-
ing (Labour Party 1997: 19). The ‘welfare to work’ ethic of New
Labour is based on the notion that in an age, where life-long
employment in one job is increasingly becoming the exception,
‘government has a vital role in equipping individuals to prosper’
(Blair 1996: 9). This rests on three elements: Government-
funded ‘welfare-to-work’ programmes, a tax system which pro-
vides incentives to work and investment in skills and training.
Between 1997 and 2001, the government introduced compulsory
‘New Deal’ programmes for all 18 – 24 year-olds who are out of
work for more than six months and also for those over 25 who
had been out of work for more than 18 months. Voluntary pro-
grammes were introduced for the long-term unemployed, single
parents and recipients of disability benefits. At the end of 2000,
the latter were also developed for people over 50 years of age
and anyone living with an unemployed person. The compulsory
programmes make it obligatory for anyone who registers as un-
employed to attend work-focused interviews with an individual
advisor at one of the new Jobcentre Plus service centres. Jobsee-
kers are able choose from one of the available options: Six
months subsidised employment or employment in the voluntary
sector, or alternatively 12 months of further education and train-
ing (Finn 2003: 117).
During its second term in government, New Labour supple-
mented the work activation programme of the ‘New Deal’ with
major tax reforms which are designed to favour those who are in
employment, particularly families with children. Already in
1999 the government had introduced tax credits for low-income
working families with children, for childcare and for the dis-
abled. This was supplemented by the introduction of the national
minimum wage at £ 3.60 per hour, which has in the meantime
risen to £ 5.73 for all workers aged 18 and over and £ 3.53 for
those under 18. In 2003 this was followed by the introduction of
a working tax credit for low-paid workers without children, a
child tax credit, which is based on family income and includes a
wider range of families than the WFTC, and also a child trust
fund, which gives every newborn child in Britain £ 250 as a
starting capital in a savings account.
2. Towards Convergence?
The Agenda 2010 and the Brown Spending Spree
On the German side, after a substantial period of a lack of re-
form activity, Schröder was finally forced to take drastic action
when unemployment in Germany hit the four million watershed
in the run-up to the 2002 general election and his re-election
was more than uncertain. Schröder attempted to strengthen his
political standing by abandoning efforts to integrate veto players
such as employers associations and the trade unions and initiat-
ing a new phase of commission government, in which he relied
exclusively on expert advice.
In February 2002, Schröder asked Peter Hartz, the chief hu-
man resources executive of the German car manufacturer Volks-
wagen to chair a commission to develop proposals for the re-
form of the labour market. In November the economics profes-
sor Bert Rürup, was commissioned with the task of examining
the reform of the welfare system, including health and pensions.
Both commissions reported their findings shortly before the
September 2002 general election. This allowed Schröder to pur-
sue a double-edged strategy. Adopting the slogan ‘Innovation
und Gerechtigkeit‘ (innovation and social justice) as the basis
for his election campaign, Schröder announced that he would in-
troduce an ambitious structural reform programme immediately
after his re-election, based on the recommendations of the two
commissions. The traditional wing of the SPD and the trade un-
ions were pacified by Schröder’s flamboyant promise to defend
the core of the Rhenish social market economy. He described
this as ‘der deutsche Weg’ (the German way), which he con-
trasted with the neo-liberal forces of Anglo-American global ca-
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pitalism that are promoting deregulation and a drastic reduction
of state influence on the economy.
After his red-green coalition had won the 2002 general elec-
tion with a slim majority, Schröder embarked on the implemen-
tation of what he called the Agenda 2010 reform programme. It
was supposed to equip the Germany economy for the forthcom-
ing challenges of the global economy in the next decade. The
core of the Agenda was the controversial Hartz legislation which
reformed German employment policy, based on the recommen-
dations made by the commission led by Peter Hartz, formerly
head of personnel at the German car manufacturer Volkswagen.
The government had already previously emphasised its pre-
ference for a strategy of Anglo-Saxon ‘support and demand’
towards the unemployed in its 2002 national action plan which
it issued in response to the recommendations of the European
Commission under the European Employment Strategy. The
Commission recommendations had called for the deregulation
of the German employment system (German Federal Govern-
ment 2003: 14). The core objectives of labour market flexibility
and activation emphasised in the EES, which had been substan-
tially influenced by the UK employment policies of New La-
bour, became an integral part of the Hartz commission’s report
on the reform proposals for the German employment system
(Büchs 2007: 75).
The red-green coalition passed the Hartz reforms in four
stages. Hartz I, which came into effect on 1 January 2003, cre-
ated personal service agencies to reduce the level of red tape
and to assist jobseekers in finding temporary work more quickly.
Hartz II, which also came into effect on 1 January 2003, intro-
duced new regulations for part-time employment. Part-time
work became exempt from taxes and social insurance contribu-
tions below a salary of  400 for the employee, while the em-
ployer pays a flat rate of 30 per cent (12 per cent if it is part-
time work in a private household). For part-time employment
with a salary of more than  400 (‘Mini Jobs’), social insurance
contributions rise in stages for the employee, while the employer
has to pay the full standard rate. It is also possible to take up
part-time work in addition to full-time employment. The founda-
tion of self-employed personal joint-stock companies (‘Ich-
AGs’) was encouraged through state subsidies of  14,400 in to-
tal over a three-year period ( 600 per month in the first year,
 360 in the second year and  240 in the third year). This has
since been limited to nine months and substantially reduced to
the level of the new unemployment benefit plus an additional
 300.
The German labour offices (Arbeitsämter) were merged with
social security offices in an attempt to reduce administrative
costs and to offer a single point of call to the unemployed. Hartz
III, which came into effect on 1 January 2004 transformed the
Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) into the new
Federal Labour Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with regio-
nal branches. The BA is supposed to be a modern service provi-
der focused on the individual needs and circumstances of each
jobseeker. At the same time with its introduction the Schröder
government adopted the concept of a single point of call which
combines all services for jobseekers which New Labour had pre-
viously introduced in the form of the Jobs Plus Centres in the
UK (Kemmerling / Bruttel 2006: 104).
The most controversial part of the package, Hartz IV, radically
reformed the system of unemployment benefits and income sup-
port. Both were merged into a basic subsidy for people who are
unemployed and do not qualify for the more generous first cate-
gory of unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I). The ALG I
entitles recipients to unemployment benefits which amount to
60 per cent of their original salary (67 per cent for claimants
with one child). The precondition for receiving ALG I is that the
claimant has previously paid social insurance contributions for
at least twelve consecutive months. In February 2006, the Hartz
reforms generally limited the receipt of ALG I to a maximum of
18 months (12 months for those under 55). The SPD has since
pushed for an extension of the periods an unemployed person
can receive ALG I. As a result the grand coalition under Chan-
cellor Merkel put into effect changes to the regulations on Janu-
ary 1st 2008. Those unemployed over 50 are now able to receive
the ALG I for a maximum of 15 months (18 for those over 55
and 24 for those over 58). The maximum period an individual
claimant is able to receive ALG I under the new regulation yet
depends on how long he or she has paid social insurance contri-
butions during the previous five years.
The new second unemployment benefit (‘Arbeitslosengeld II’)
is a tax-funded merger of the former unemployment benefit and
income support, which covers all those who do not qualify, or
who have exceeded the maximum period during which they can
receive ALG I. The rates for ALG II were deliberately set at the
level of the former income support to encourage people to sub-
sidise themselves with additional part-time work or minor forms
employment. As the following Table shows, the grand coalition
under Merkel has since slightly increased the level of payment
for all categories and introduced a single rate across the whole
of Germany in July 2008. The ALG II was increased again on
July 1st 2009, particularly for children in the household, who are
now also recognised in the age group of under six years of age
(see the following Table). Additional support is granted for ren-
tal payments and heating costs and to pregnant women, single
parents and disabled people.
General monthly rates for recipients
of ‘Arbeitslosengeld 2’ (ALG 2)
Before 1 July 2007
Single
Person
Partner
(aged 19+)
Child
(under 14)
Child
(15 – 18)
West  345  310,50  207  276
East  331  298  199  265
(100%) (90%) (60%) (80%)
New unitary rates across Germany since 1 July 2008
Single
Person
Partner
(aged 18+)
Child
(under 14)
Child
(14 – 25)
 351  316  211  281
(100%) (90%) (60%) (80%)
Increased rates since 1 July 2009
Single
Person
Partner
(aged 18+)
Child
(0 – 6)
Child
(7 – 14)
Child
(15 – 25)
 59  323  215  251  287
Source: Federal Ministry for Employment and Welfare (2009).
Like welfare benefits in the UK, the ALG II is rigorously
means-tested. Individual claims are assessed by the regional
branches of the Federal Labour Agencies, which took over this
task from local authorities. The Hartz laws determine that any-
one who can at least work for three hours a day, which includes
people who are temporarily off work to raise children, is consid-
ered to be ‘capable of gainful employment’ (Federal Labour
Agency 2008A6: 32). The only groups who are currently ex-
cluded from this are the chronically ill and the disabled.
The means-testing for ALG II does not only take into account
the individual circumstances of the claimant, but considers
everyone in the context of a ‘household community’ (‘Bedarfs-
gemeinschaft’). Personal savings and possessions of the clai-
mants and anyone living in the household are therefore consid-
ered for means- testing. This includes parents, spouses, non-
married partners and children under 25. Recipients of ALG II
are encouraged by their personal advisor in the Federal Labour
Agency to take up available employment. This often occurs in
the form of ‘Mini Jobs’ with an income of less than  400 per
month or the ‘one euro jobs’, which are free from social insur-
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ance contributions for the employee. The latter are jobs in the
community sector which are compulsory for ALG II recipients
if offered by an employment agency and are based on a very
small salary or other forms of compensation paid in addition to
the standard government transfer as ALG II subsidies. Those
who receive the ALG II unemployment benefit and earn be-
tween  100 and  800 get a tax-free allowance of 20 per cent of
their income (Federal Labour Agency 2008: 37). In addition,
young people who receive ALG II are generally expected to en-
ter training programmes or any other form of employment to
avoid falling into the trap of welfare dependency.
An essential part of the reform package was the attempt to
achieve slightly greater flexibility in the German employment
system by allowing opt-outs from general wage agreements
(Flächentarifverträge) for individual companies. However, in
each case they have to be strictly consensually agreed between
employers and trade unions, and by modestly relaxing the pro-
tection against unfair dismissal (Kündigungsschutz) for smaller
companies (with less than ten employees). It was hoped that this
will encourage more employers to offer at least temporary jobs
to the unemployed, which in fact did occur to a certain extent as
a result of the reforms as recent data by the BA demonstrates
(Federal Labour Agency 2008).
While Hartz IV has certainly modified the institutional foun-
dations of the German employment model, it can be argued that
the reforms were not radical enough that they could be classified
as having substantially altered the nature of the German social
market economy (Haucap / Pauly 2007). This is however the
subject of a continuous debate in Germany, which is spear-
headed by the party Die Linke which argues that Hartz funda-
mentally undermined the solidarity principle of the German wel-
fare state. The Hartz IV labour market reforms have indeed wea-
kened the Bismarckian welfare state principle of ‘life standard
guarantee’, which amounted to a state-guaranteed protection
against social descent and poverty through high levels of wage
replacement (Clasen 2005: 32; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 112). This
had previously established a German welfare state culture where
the unemployed were predominantly administered and provided
with little incentives to actively look for employment as they re-
ceived benefits above the wage level offered in many jobs (Cza-
da 2005: 167 – 169). Since the steep increase of unemployment
to over two million in the mid-1980s and the increase of social
insurance contributions to over 30 per cent of the individual
gross income (Steingart 2004: 97) the German welfare system
became trapped in an increasingly vicious circle of steadily ris-
ing social insurance contributions for a decreasing number of
people in full-time employment. This amounted to what some
classified as ‘a functional equivalent of the Keynesian reflation
state’ (Streeck 2005: 146). For critics of the Hartz package the
reforms represent a decisive break with the traditional German
welfare culture by severing the link between former earnings
and unemployment benefit (Kemmerling / Bruttel 2006: 96) This
poses the risk of increasing levels of poverty particularly
amongst older workers who become dependent on the low sup-
port offered under ALG II if their efforts to return to employ-
ment remain unsuccessful. By introducing the ‘welfare-to-work’
principle into the German welfare state, the Hartz reforms have
substantially reduced the responsibility of the state to provide
income maintenance for the unemployed. The German welfare
state culture has therefore indeed incorporated elements of the
culture of individual responsibility which are usually found in
liberal economies like the UK. If this was accompanied by even
more radical reforms of the German employment systems under
future governments, the Hartz laws could indeed in retrospective
still be considered as the first wave of a gradual systemic change
towards a more liberal economic model.
The Hartz labour market reforms have also led to a higher
level of vertical disintegration in the German industrial relations
system, which has led to an increase in the outsourcing of jobs
to the low-wage sector of smaller companies, which tends to not
be covered by collective agreements. Consequently only around
50 per cent of East German employees and less than 70 per cent
of West German employees are currently covered by collective
wage agreements (Bosch 2008: 17). This certainly reflects a
trend towards a greater diversity in the German industrial rela-
tions system. At this stage however one cannot detect an overall
strategy amongst employers to try eradicate the system of col-
lective bargaining (Doellgast / Greer 2007: 71). In spite of the
changes described above the fundaments of German industrial
relations predominantly continue to follow the traditional pat-
terns of ‘centralisation and coordination’ (Funk 2007: 128).
The red-green coalition’s delayed introduction of labour mar-
ket reforms coincided with a fundamental shift in New Labour’s
budgetary policy. While the New Labour government had
strictly kept to the tight limit on public spending limits set out
by their Conservative predecessors during its first term in office,
Chancellor Gordon Brown announced a new spending plan for
public services for the period up to 2006 in his first budget fol-
lowing New Labour’s second landslide election victory in 2001,
which meant a large increase in real terms. Total public spend-
ing in the UK has hence consistently risen from around £ 362
billion in 2001 to around £ 575 billion in 2008, with the big-
gest ever post-war increase in health spending in Britain. NHS
spending has almost doubled between 2001 and 2008, from £ 53
to £ 102 billion in 20083.
Under New Labour public spending gap between the UK and
the rest of the EU-15 has consequently substantially narrowed
since the late 1990s, which is particularly noticeable when com-
paring the UK and Germany, where British government expendi-
ture has even been higher than in Germany since 2007 (see Fig-
ure 1). These changes distinguish New Labour’s economic ap-
proach noticeably from the Thatcherite culture of ‘rolling back
the state’ under previous Conservative administrations, which
rejected the notion that taxpayers should be burdened with the
funding of public services. Some scholars even detect distinc-
tively Keynesian elements in New Labour’s policy approach,
concentrating mainly on the ‘willingness and capacity to pursue
deficit finance in appropriate circumstances’ (Clift / Tomlinson
2007: 52) with the overall goal of fighting unemployment.
Source: EUROSTAT.
Figure 1: Total general goverment expenditure
In spite of the sustained public investment program introduced
by New Labour, the UK nevertheless still spends substantially
less on social benefits than the EU-27 average, particularly less
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3 Source: HM Treasury Public Expenditure and Statistical Ana-
lyses (2009),http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pesa2009_tables.htm.
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than continental welfare states like Germany. Figure 2 illustrates
that in spite of the lower welfare payments in the wake of the
Hartz reforms and slightly lower overall spending on welfare
benefits, it is noticeable that Germany maintains a relatively
high level of welfare spending. The UK remains below the aver-
age EU-15 levels on welfare spending, which at least in this area
points to the persistence of the Thatcherite legacy of a rather in-
dividualistic welfare culture, where the political debate con-
tinues to be dominated by an ‘image of taxpayers versus (frau-
dulent) benefit claimants’ (Clasen, 2005: 32).
Source: EUROSTAT.
Figure 2: Social benefits (other than social transfers in kind)
paid by general government
The concrete effects of New Labour’s social policies show that
a certain level of criticism is justified, particularly as the record
level of economic growth and job creation over more than a dec-
ade since 1997 has not resulted in noticeable socially cohesive
outcomes. In the comparative European context, New Labour’s
approach has yet to prove that it can produce levels of social co-
hesion that are equal to those of continental welfare state models.
The risk of remaining trapped in poverty after receiving social
transfers, measured on the basis of remaining below the thresh-
old of 60 per cent of the national median disposable income, has
persistently remained at the level of 18 (lowest) and 19 (highest)
per cent since 1997, whilst the EU-15 average tends to fluctuate
around 16 – 17 per cent. In contrast, the German welfare state
continues to be more efficient in preventing poverty, even though
the effects of persistently high levels of structural unemployment
in the East since reunification and more recently also the reduc-
tion of welfare benefits under Hartz IV described in this article
have led to a rise in poverty levels. In comparison to the UK this
increase is yet still relatively modest, from 12 per cent in 1997 to
the up until now highest level of 15 per cent in 2007.4 It had fall-
en afterwards due to the positive effects of the upswing in 2008
which however ended in the same year.
New Labour still faces the challenge to convincingly defend
its ‘third way’ approach against accusations that it represents a
rather managerial cost-cutting exercise (Hutton 2003: 118), a
point that has also been put forward by critics of the Agenda
2010 reforms in Germany (Bosch 2004: 16). Whilst both the UK
and Germany face a growing problem with income inequality
and resulting poverty, a particular concern for New Labour has
to be the fact that the level of income inequality between those
at the top and the bottom end of the income scale today is actu-
ally higher than under earlier Conservative administrations.
New Labour’ post-1997 economic and employment boom lar-
gely benefitted the middle class and those at the top of the in-
comes scale (Deacon 2003: 138). The ratio between the equiva-
lised disposable income of the 20 per cent highest earners and
those of the 20 per cent at the bottom of the income scale is less
favourable than in Germany and amongst the EU-25 average.
The ratio has risen from 5.0 in 1997 to 5.5 in 2006, which con-
trasts unfavourably with the EU-15 average of 4.7 and the Ger-
man average of 4.15. It is nevertheless noticeable that since the
introduction of the Hartz IV laws, income inequality has also
risen in Germany and under the conditions of the current global
economic crisis it is likely to increase further in the future.
This generally raises the question if the very strong focus of
the ‘third way’ approach on the rapid creation of employment is
in practice able to support the logic of the EU Lisbon strategy
that high employment rates result in rising levels of social cohe-
sion. A substantial section of the jobs created in Britain and Ger-
many in recent years are failing to provide adequate earnings,
particularly for people on medium and lower incomes. The 2008
Institute for Fiscal Studies report on poverty and inequality in
the UK highlights that real income growth for the poorest in-
come quintile group in the period between 2004 / 05 and 2006 /
07 was negative (minus 1.1 per cent), with just minor improve-
ments for middle incomes (between 0.1 and 0.6 per cent) and
substantial above zero growth only amongst the top earners (plus
1.2 per cent) (Brewer et al. 2008: 22). The overall increase in
income inequality under New Labour is shown in the increase of
the Gini coefficient from 0.33 to a record 0.35 (Ibid: 27). In
terms of the general debate about rising poverty in the UK, the
IFS observes that, in spite of general declining levels of poverty
since 1997, New Labour’s welfare policies have in recent years
failed to stop a trend which sees a rise in poverty amongst chil-
dren and pensioners and even amongst working people with our
without children (Ibid: 37). When considering the British case
where poverty has not been substantially reduced in spite of a
decade of continuous employment growth, the logic that work
itself can be regarded as a universally effective anti-poverty
measure hence has to be questioned.
3. Conclusion
The comparative analysis of the economic and social policy
reforms in the UK and Germany since the late 1990s illustrates
that processes of policy learning are possible between govern-
ments in fundamentally different domestic socio-economic path-
ways, if they are facilitated by certain conditions. In the case
presented in this article these were visible in the (if only tempor-
ary) correspondence in political preferences between the top
leadership of New Labour and the SPD, combined with a sub-
stantial level of domestic reform pressure in Germany and con-
sequently the opportunity for Chancellor Schröder to sideline
institutional veto players and to implement the Agenda 2010
reforms.
Since the 2005 general election the policies of the two parties
have started to develop into noticeably different directions. This
reinforces the view that in spite of the ability of national actors
to make choices about changes in the direction of policies, they
are usually unlikely to substantially alter the essential path de-
pendent culture of existing domestic institutions. As could be
expected, New Labour hence abided by the inherent domestic
culture of scepticism towards state welfare provision and has re-
cently pushed its welfare reforms towards a more radical direc-
tion. The Department of Work and Pensions has hence followed
the recommendations made by the Freud report (Freud 2007)
and is now including the most inactive societal groups, particu-
larly single mothers and less severely disabled people, into com-
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4 Source: EUROSTAT (2009), Living Conditions and Welfare: At
risk of poverty rate after social transfers by gender.
5 Source: EUROSTAT (2009), Living Conditions and Welfare:
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pulsory labour market activation programmes. (Department of
Work and Pensions 2008: 12).
In contrast, the SPD responded to increasing public hostility
and the institutional resistance in many German regions towards
the detailed implementation of the Hartz reforms (Kemmerling /
Bruttel 2006: 106) by promoting itself as the guardian of the
German social market economy against more radical reform
proposals put forward by the CDU / CSU and the FDP during
the 2005 general election campaign. In the subsequent grand
coalition government with the CDU under Merkel, the SPD has
since wavered between general support and criticism of Schrö-
der’s Agenda reforms. The mounting public opposition against
the Hartz labour market reforms have led to a surge in support
for the SPD’s left-wing political rival, the Linkspartei spear-
headed by former SPD leader Lafontaine, even in the Western
part of the country. Due to the electoral unpopularity of the
Hartz laws, the SPD is now emphasising the need to increase the
ALG-II tariffs on a regular basis in order to prevent ‘the unem-
ployed from descending into poverty’ (SPD 2009: 20) and also
continues to campaign for the introduction of a general mini-
mum wage and additional wage subsidies for those on low in-
comes.
The parameters for national policy reform have undoubtedly
been altered dramatically as a result of the ongoing global eco-
nomic recession following the collapse of parts of the financial
industries in the United States in 2008. Future comparative ana-
lyses of socio-economic transformation will need to assess the
impact of this crisis of global capitalism on the varieties of na-
tional economies and social models, particularly in respect of
the changes within the British model as a result of the unprece-
dented level of government interference and the part-nationali-
sation of the banking industry under prime minister Gordon
Brown. These developments and a greater focus on rebuilding
the domestic manufacturing industry could in the future signifi-
cantly alter the core of Britain’s liberal economic model.
Similarly the effects of the global recession could in the long
run lead towards a new reform debate in Germany, particularly
if the country’s economic performance continues to decline in
future years. Currently Germany’s traditional anti-reformist cli-
mate is once again dominating the domestic political discourse
(Green / Paterson 2008: 192). The fact that the global recession
had its origins in the relatively unregulated financial industries
of the liberal economies in the United States, Britain and Ireland
has made it less attractive for German policy-makers to promote
the further deregulation of the German social market economy.
The SPD is using the current economic situation to praise the
institutional foundations and the focus on high-quality manufac-
turing of the German model as a competitive advantage against
its more liberal competitors. This accompanied by a clear criti-
cism of New Labour’s overreliance on ‘services and the finan-
cial sector’ (Steinmeier 2009).
The policy trends in Britain and Germany following the pub-
lication of the Blair-Schröder paper consequently illustrate that
national responses to the challenge of globalisation remain dis-
tinctively diverse in terms of policy detail and speed of imple-
mentation as a result of prevailing institutional and cultural dif-
ferences. This reinforces the importance of the historical institu-
tional view that in spite of the common challenges national eco-
nomic models are facing in the increasingly interdependent
global economy, policy change continues to occur on the basis
of established path-dependent institutional cultures. Instead of
pursuing a one-size-fits-all deregulated convergence model, na-
tional policy-makers are hence trying to increase the compara-
tive advantages of their economies on the basis of ‘development
through adaptation of competitiveness-enhancing modes of in-
tervention sensitive to institutional and cultural specificities’
(Hay 2000: 519)
Future comparative analyses of socio-economic transforma-
tion will nonetheless increasingly have to take into account the
growing importance of actors and processes which occur outside
the established domestic institutions of individual economic
models (Allen 2006: 147). These include transnational forms of
policy learning and also new mechanisms of domestic govern-
ance, like the use of expert commissions. It remains to be seen if
these processes, particularly if they increasingly involve actors
from outside the national institutional culture, will in the long
lead to new forms of policy transfer and ultimately towards gre-
ater convergence between existing models.
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